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NOTES
the basis of sex or religion with those relating to race or national
origin.
Finally, Griggs involved an employment test"5 and its prece-
dential value may be limited on that basis. Consequently, different
employment practices would be analyzed under different standards
withiji the same statutory scheme.
The most likely impact of the General Electric decision will be
to allow the courts to analyze employment practices which pertain
to pregnant employees under different standards than other em-
ployment practices: while the Griggs effect test will remain a viable
tool for the analysis of other Title VII cases," 6 a fourteenth amend-
ment standard of discrimination will be applied to those cases which
involve pregnant women. Thus, the test which the Court has an-
nounced to determine whether an employment practice discrimi-
nates against women itself is discriminatory.
BARBARA UNGAR ROYSTON
Defense of Entrapment Is Denied to a Defendant
Who Is Predisposed to Commit a Crime
In Hampton v. United States the Supreme Court held that the
defense of entrapment is not available to a defendant who pro-
cured contraband from a government agent if the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime. In this article the history of the
defense of entrapment and the reasoning of the divided court in
deciding the Hampton case are examined in detail. The author
concludes that the rule set by the Hampton case encourages vio-
lation of defendants' rights by police, and that legislative reform
may be necessary.
Charles Hampton made two sales of heroin to federal agents. The
heroin was allegedly' supplied to Hampton by a Federal Drug En-
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) dealt with employment tests. Griggs also dealt with
the requirement of a high school education for purposes of being hired or transferred.
106. A majority of the Court in General Electric still expressed support for the Griggs
test at least in some instances.
1. The defendant and the government witnesses related two significantly dissimilar ver-
sions of events to the jury. Defendant claimed that the DEA informant obtained the drug
(which defendant believed to be nonnarcotic) that defendant admittedly thereafter solicited
and sold. The government's witnesses testified that Hampton had obtained and supplied
what he knew to be contraband. The Supreme Court dealt with defendant's version for
purposes of the appeal, and went on to hold this "fact" legally insignificant.
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forcement Administration (DEA) informant. At a jury trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
Hampton did not request the standard entrapment jury instruc-
tions;2 rather, he requested an instruction which in essence stated
that if the jury should find that the narcotics sold by the defendant
were supplied to him by an agent of the government, then the jury
"must acquit."3
The trial court refused the proffered instruction, and the jury
found Hampton guilty.' Hampton appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed.5 On certior-
ari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed: "[A]
defendant may be convicted for the sale of contraband which he
procured from a government informer or agent." I The defense of
entrapment is not available to a defendant who has admitted that
he was predisposed to commit the crime charged. Nor will a claim
that the defendant was denied due process be upheld solely on the
basis that the government has supplied him with the contraband.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
Prior to Hampton, the nature and extent of the affirmative
defense7 of entrapment' in the federal courts9 had been roughly de-
2. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
3. Id. at 486. Specifically, defendant had requested the following:
The defendant asserts that he was the victim of entrapment as to the crimes
charged in the indictment.
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcotics
supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on behalf of the
government, then you must acquit the defendant because the law as a matter of
policy forbids his conviction in such a case.
Furthermore, under this particular defense, you need not consider the predis-
position of the defendant to commit the offense charged, because if the govern-
mental involvement through its informer reached the point that i have just de-
fined in your own minds, then the predisposition of the defendant would not
matter.
4. Hampton was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 425 U.S. at 485.
5. 507 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
6. 425 U.S. at 485.
7. Where the issue has been presented, most courts have rejected the use of the entrap-
ment defense by a defendant who has denied committing the unlawful act. See Groot, The
Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrap-
ment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254; 56 IOWA L. REV. 686 (1971). But cf. Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
8. The unlawful use of entrapment must be distinguished from legitimate police prac-
tices, including police encouragement which "is used to detect such crimes as prostitution,
gambling and narcotic sales-those 'vice crimes' that are prohibited by laws protecting the
general health and welfare of the public." 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 570 (1973). One commentator
explains:
By their very nature, many crimes require the use of artifice and deception by
the police to ferret out offenders. As a result, it has become well settled that police
officers may use traps, decoys, and informers to prevent and detect criminal
[Vol. 32:173
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lineated by three Supreme Court decisions.'" In Sorrells v. United
States," a federal prohibition agent posing as a tourist visited the
defendant twice and asked him for some liquor. Each time the
agent's request was refused. Subsequently, the agent managed to
gain the defendant's confidence with conversations about their mu-
tual war experiences. Whereupon, after a third request, the defen-
dant supplied his visitor with a half gallon of whiskey. The defen-
dant was thereafter prosecuted for violating the National Prohibi-
tion Act. Chief Justice Hughes, in a majority opinion joined by four
other members of the Court, held that as a matter of Congressional
intent and statutory construction" the defense of entrapment was
conduct. This practice is known as encouragement and, generally, resort to such
means will not prevent prosecution of the offender. There are times, however,
when police solicitation of crime goes beyond merely affording the opportunities
or facilities for the commission of the offense, and becomes instead police manu-
facture of crime-entrapment.
Comment, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655 (1974). See also Comment, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63 (1967).
9. The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of entrapment in the federal courts.
Since the defense has not been elevated to constitutional dimensions, its application is not
obligatory upon the states. However, all states, with the possible exception of Tennessee,
recognize the entrapment defense in some form. IOWA L. REV., supra note 8, at 655 n.10. See
also Comment, 37 Mo. L. ]tEV. 633 (1972).
10. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
The defense of entrapment was first mentioned by a federal court in United States v.
Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878); See 58 MINN. L. REV. 325, 326 (1973); 45 TEX. L.
REV. 578, 579 (1967). The defense was first recognized and upheld by a federal court in 1915
in Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) (government agents induced de-
fendant to import illegal aliens). For a general historical background of the development of
entrapment, see Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some State
Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959); Defeo, Entrapment as a Defense to
Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U. S. F. L. REV. 243 (1967);
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs, 60
YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA.
L. REV. 245 (1942).
Entrapment was defined by Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932) (concurring opinion), as: "[Tihe conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officier." Id. at 454.
For a general discussion of both encouragement and entrapment, see Bancroft,
Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment: Device and Defense,
31 U. Cm. L. REV. 137 (1963); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement,
49 VA. L. REV. 871 (1963).
11. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
12. Chief Justice Hughes, in referring to the National Prohibition Act, stated:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting
this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by
the instigation of government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise
innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.
287 U.S. at 448.
The Chief Justice concluded: "Fundamentally, the question is whether the defense, if
19771
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available and that the trial court had erred in concluding that there
was no entrapment as a matter of law. Rather, the issue was one
that should have been presented to the jury. 3
The majority recognized that while the government may em-
ploy artifice and strategem to apprehend those who engage in crimi-
nal enterprises, 4 "[a] different question is presented when the
criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that
they may prosecute."' 5 Since this test, frequently characterized as
the subjective test, 6 focuses on the origin of intent the Court indi-
cated that "the predisposition and criminal design of the defendant
are relevant."' 7 Accordingly,
the facts bear it out, takes the case out of the purview of the statute because it cannot be
supposed that the Congress intended that the letter of its enactment should be used to
support such gross perversion of its purpose." Id. at 452.
13. Id. at 452.
14. See note 8 supra.
15. 287 U.S. at 442.
16. For example, see Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Russell v. United
States, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973).
Adoption and application of the subjective test has produced a flood of commen-
tary-much of it severely critical. See, e.g., Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the
Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 39; Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of
Encouragement, 4 Hous. L. REV. 609 (1967); 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965); 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546
(1974); 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 82 (1973).
One commentator explained:
Moreover, the genesis of intent test is fraught with inconsistencies. The en-
trapment doctrine by definition concerns itself with the impermissibility of some
police detection practices.' If the question is which practices, it is plainly unres-
ponsive to answer with an inquiry into the state of mind of the victim of the police
conduct in issue. The result of that inquiry would be the same if the entrapper
were a private citizen, yet it is settled that in such a case there is no defense. And
when the courts speak of genesis of intent, they cannot mean pure intent to the
specific crime charged, for even an entrapped defendant intends the acts for
which he is indicted. The courts can be referring only to a general, pre-existent
disposition to violate the law; attempts to defend the test as a psychiatrically
valid distinction between "chronic" and "situational" offenders certainly have
assumed as much. This suggests a more fundamental problem: in finding that the
defendant harbored a general criminal predisposition, on the basis of evidence of
his prior criminal behavior, the courts are convicting the defendant for offenses
for which he is not being tried. For these offenses, the chronic offender apparently
could not be convicted directly, for if the police had possessed sufficient evidence
thereof, there would have been no need to induce defendant into another offense.
42 FORDHAM L. REV. 454, 458-59 (1973).
17. 287 U.S. at 451.
The defense of entrapment under the subjective predisposition test, has four essential
elements: (1) a governmental instigation resulting in the commission of a crime, (2) actual
inducements by government agents, (3) establishment of causation between the government's
inducements and the defendant's actions, and (4) lack of criminal design by the defendant
NOTES
the government in such a case is in no position to object to evi-
dence of the activities of its representatives in relation to the
accused, and if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrap-
ment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry
into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that
issue.'
Several leading jurists 9 and commentators' have severely criti-
cized the admissibility of such hearsay evidence on the grounds,
inter alia, that it severely prejudices the defendant and is often
unreliable.
Mr. Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone,
concurred in the decision to reverse, but did so through a different
approach. Mr. Justice Roberts believed that the doctrine of entrap-
ment is based not on statutory construction, but on "a fundamental
rule of public policy."2' The concurring justices argued that the true
doctrinal basis for entrapment rests in the importance of preserving
"the purity of government and its processes."2 In short, the focus
of Mr. Justice Roberts' approach was on the nature of police con-
duct,2" instead of on the origin of intent or predisposition. It is prin-
with regard to commission of the instant crime. 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 579, 580 (1977); MINN.
L. REV. supra note 10, at 328 n.16.
18. 287 U.S. at 451.
19. The concurring Justices in Sorrells and Sherman, and the dissenters in Russell all
expressed their fear of such a procedure. Mr. Justice Stewart explained:
[A] test that makes the entrapment defense depend on whether the defendant
had the requisite predisposition permits the introduction into evidence of all
kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and rumor-all of which would be inadmissible in any
other context-in order to prove the defendant's predisposition. It allows the
prosecution, in offering such proof, to rely on the defendant's bad reputation or
past criminal activities, including even rumored activities of which the prosecu-
tion may have insufficient evidence to obtain an indictment, and to present the
agent's suspicions as to why they chose to tempt this defendant. This sort of
evidence is not only unreliable, as the hearsay rule recognizes; but it is also highly
prejudicial, especially if the matter is submitted to the jury, for, despite instruc-
tions to the contrary, the jury may well consider such evidence as probative not
simply of the defendant's predisposition, but of his guilt of the offense with which
he stands charged.
411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
20. Bancroft, supra note 10, at 171; Donnelly, supra note 10, at 1108: Mikell, supra note
10, at 252; 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 802, 806 (1974); IowA L. REV., supra note 8, at 659-60; U.
FLA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 77.
21. 287 U.S. at 457 (concurring opinion).
22. Id.
23. Since it was Mr. Justice Roberts' belief that the underlying rationale for the defense
of entrapment was based on an intolerable degree of government participation, he urged that
the entrapment issue was one that should properly be submitted to the court-not the jury.
Specifically, Mr. Justice Roberts stated: "The protection of its own functions and the preser-
vation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court
and the court alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law." Id.
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cipally for this reason that this formulation has been characterized
as the "objective" approach. 4
This split in doctrinal philosophy, the subjective-objective or
majority-minority dichotomy, again surfaced in the Supreme Court
in 1958 in Sherman v. United States.25 In Sherman, a government
informer first met the defendant in a doctor's office where both were
apparently being treated for narcotics addiction. Several accidental
meetings followed, and conversation progressed to a discussion of
mutual experiences and problems including their attempts to over-
come addiction to narcotics. Ultimately, the informer asked Sher-
man to supply him with a source of narcotics because he was not
responding to treatment. Only after a number of repetitions of the
request, predicated on the informer's purported suffering, did the
defendant finally acquiesce. Several times thereafter the defendant
shared narcotics with the informer, who notified agents of the Bu-
reau of Narcotics. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of
selling narcotics.
On the authority of Sorrells, Chief Justice Warren concluded
for the majority" that entrapment had been established as a valid
defense.27 The Court affirmed the theory underlying Sorrells, stat-
ing:
[T]he fact that government agents 'merely afford opportunities
or facilities for the commission of the offense does not' constitute
entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct
was 'the product of the creative activity' of law-enforcement offi-
cials. To determine whether entrapment has been established, a
line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and
the trap for the unwary criminal."
Moreover, he reiterated the belief that "Congress could not have
intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent
24. Unlike its "subjective" counterpart, the objective test has received a warm reception
in a substantial body of literature. See, e.g., Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and
Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 399 (1959); 40 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 802 (1974); 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 454 (1973); Comment, 1 U.S.F.L. REV. 177 (1966). The
objective approach, however, is not without its critics. For a brief criticism of both tests and
a proposed alternative, see 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (1960).
25. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
26. In addition to the Chief Justice, the majority included Justices Black, Burton, Clark,
and Whittaker.
27. The Sherman Court found entrapment as a matter of law. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Court did not in any way abandon the concept that entrapment was generally
to be submitted to the jury. The Court emphasized that in this case there was not a question
of "choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor judging credibility." 356 U.S. at 373.
28. Id. at 372 (emphasis added) (citations and explanatory notes omitted).
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persons into violations." 9 In essence, the Sherman majority had
expanded the Sorrells majority's statutory construction of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act into a general principle of law. 0 Furthermore,
it was again decided that in all but the clearest cases, the question
of entrapment is to be decided by the jury.'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other members32 of the
Court, concurred in the result, while urging that Mr. Justice Rob-
erts' minority opinion in Sorrells represented the better reasoned
theory for the entrapment defense. He strenuously argued that the
basis for the test should necessarily be objective; it must focus on
the permissible level of police activity which "does not vary accord-
ing to the particular defendant concerned."33 He framed the under-
lying question: "[W]hether the police conduct revealed in the par-
ticular case falls below standards, to which common feelings re-
spond, for the proper use of governmental power."'" Mr. Justice
Frankfurter further insisted that it was immaterial to decide
whether the intention to commit the crime originated with either
the defendant or the police. 5
In Russell v. United States,36 the next entrapment case to reach
the Supreme Court, the majority's approach remained the same,
although an important factual difference existed. In Russell, an
undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics offered to
supply the defendants with an essential ingredient37 in the manufac-
ture of methamphetamine 5 in return for one half of the drug pro-
duced. Thereafter, one of the defendants completed the manufac-
turing process and consummated with the arrangement with the
agent. Subsequently, the "business arrangement" was repeated on
request of the agent, who then secured a search warrant and seized
several incriminating items from the laboratory where the manufac-
turing process had taken place. Defendants were convicted, and on
appeal defendant Russell "conceded that the jury could have found
him predisposed to commit the offenses."39 The Court of Appeals for
29. Id.
30. See Mikell, supra note 10, at 255-56; 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 454, 458 (1973).
31. See 356 U.S. at 377.
32. Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan.
33. 356 U.S. at 383 (concurring opinion).
34. Id. at 382.
35. Id. In addition, he expressed concern with the prejudicial effect of past character
evidence on the jury.
36. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
37. The chemical was phenyl-2-propanone. 411 U.S. at 425.
38. Methamphetamine is commonly referred to as "speed."
39. Id. at 427.
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the Ninth Circuit 0 reversed, however, and "in effect expanded the
traditional notion of entrapment . . . to mandate dismissal of a
criminal prosecution whenever the court determines that there has
been 'an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the
criminal enterprise.' ",41
In reversing the Ninth Circuit and affirming Russell's convic-
tion, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 42 empha-
sized that Sorrells and Sherman had established entrapment as a
relatively limited defense. 43 The Court recognized that there are
criticisms44 and drawbacks to the subjective test, yet reiterated in
haec verba:
[The subjective-majority test) is rooted . ..in the notion that
Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a de-
fendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed of-
fense but was induced to commit them by the Government.
Thus, the thrust of the entrapment defense was held to
focus on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit
the crime.
45
The Russell decision served, inter alia, as a response to several
lower federal courts, 4 numerous critics,4 and Russell, himself, who
were insisting that entrapment was present whenever there was
"overzealous law enforcement. ' 4 The Court, in fact, admonished
the federal courts to refrain from applying the defense as a
"'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which
[they do] not approve."'" Although Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not
specifically mention any lower court decisions, it is clear that he was
referring to several which had more or less adopted the objective test
40. Russell v. United States, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
41. 411 U.S. at 427.
42. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Black-
mun, and Powell.
43. 411 U.S. at 435.
44. Id. at 433-34. Justice Rehnquist briefly mentioned the criticisms and summarily
dismissed them on the basis of Sherman and Sorrells. It is interesting to note, however, that
in Sorrells the rationale of implied Congressional intent was used solely to construe the
National Prohibition Act-not as a broad doctrinal base. Furthermore, in Sherman, the
criticisms of the predisposition test were not discussed by the Court because the arguments
had not been raised by counsel. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
45. 411 U.S. at 435, 429.
46. "By 1973, most circuits had at least implicitly embraced the minority approach in
cases of truly reprehensible police conduct." 59 CORNELL L. REv. 546, 557 (1974) (footnote
omitted). See note 51 infra, and accompanying text.
47. See notes 16, 19, 20 and 24, supra.




in lieu of the Sorrells-Sherman subjective test.50
. Mr. Justice Rehnquist initially had rejected the defendant's
argument that the government's participation in his case violated
the fundamental principles of due process.5' The Court held that the
analogy to the exclusionary rule's application to illegal searches and
seizures" and confessions53 was imperfect, "for the principal reason
50. See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir.
1968); Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784 ( D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc); United States v.
Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970); cf. United States v. Morrison, 348 F.2d 1003
(2d Cir, 1965); Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958): United States v. Kros,
296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
The most frequently discussed cases of this type, cited in both the Russell and Hampton
dissents, include United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D.
Cal. 1970). In McGrath, the Seventh Circuit reversed a conviction for possession of counterfeit
currency where the government had taken charge of the counterfeiting operation after the
defendant had initially purchased the requisite materials. The court explained that it was
"repugnant to the most elemental notions of justice to permit law enforcement personnel to
manufacture counterfeit bills, deliver them, and then arrest the recipient for possession of
contraband." 468 F.2d at 1030. The Ninth Circuit in Greene found "wholly impermissible
participation by the Government," where an undercover agent supplied the defendant with
sugar at wholesale prices and acted as his only customer in a bootlegging operation. 454 F.2d
at 784. Finally, in Chisum, the defendant was charged with receipt of counterfeit bills with
intent to pass them as genuine where the bills had been supplied by a federal agent. The
district court dismissed the indictment on the basis of government misconduct. 312 F. Supp.
at 1312.
Additionally, McGrath and Chisum and the decision of the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), share the characteristic that in each, the government
agents themselves furnished the defendant with the contraband for which he was convicted.
The Russell majority concluded that this point need not be decided because, in any event,
the ingredient supplied to the defendant by the government agent was not unlawful or impos-
sible to obtain. 411 U.S. at 431-32.
In Bueno, a case pre-dating Russell, entrapment was held as a matter of law on facts
closely analogous to those in Hampton. The court described the conduct of the government
informer in selling heroin to Bueno and arranging sales for him as follows: "The story takes
on the element of the government buying heroin from itself, through an intermediary, the
defendant, and then charging him with the crime." 447 F.2d at 905. This principle was
subsequently upheld by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.
1974), in the face of Russell.
51. 411 U.S. at 430-32.
It is interesting to note that the majority in Russell emphasized this fact and immedi-
ately thereafter alluded to the possible application of the due process principles in other
situations to bar a criminal prosection. Id. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, relied on the
finding of the Court of Appeals that "there could not have been the manufacture, delivery or
sale of the illicit drug had it not been for the Government's supply of one of the essential
ingredients." 452 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972).
Subsequently, in Hampton, the Justices voting to affirm defendant's conviction stressed
the difficulty of obtaining pheno-2-propanone. Mr. Justice Powell, in fact, cited to Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart's dissent in Russell. Conversely, the Hampton dissenters attempted to distin-
guish Russell by using the Russell majority's description of the situation. 425 U.S. at 498
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
53. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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behind the adoption of the exclusionary rule was the Government's
'failure to observe its own laws.' Unlike the situations giving rise to
the holdings in Mapp and Miranda, the Government's conduct here
violated no independent constitutional right of the [defendant]." 54
It seemed, however, that the Russell majority nonetheless left
the door open for a future claim of outrageous police conduct viola-
tive of due process."
A strong dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Stewart
who was joined by two other Justices. 8 Mr. Justice Stewart summa-
rized both the subjective and objective approaches to the entrap-
ment defense, and expressed his extreme disfavor with the former.
He indicated that the majority's reliance on the "unexpressed in-
tent" of Congress not to prosecute those "otherwise innocent" was
misplaced. 7 Such a rationale, he urged, does not explain why the
defense may be raised only where the conduct of the government,
as opposed to private citizens, instigates an "otherwise innocent"
non-predisposed defendant to commit a criminal act. 8 Stewart's
solution was adoption of the objective test enunciated by Justices
Roberts and Frankfurter. Due to the importance to him of preserv-
ing the integrity of the system, Justice Stewart emphasized the level
of governmental activity in framing the issue: "[W]hether-
regardless of the predisposition to crime of the particular defendant
involved-the government agents have acted in such a way as is
likely to instigate or create a criminal offense."5
It should be emphasized that a defense based upon due process
was not adopted by any of the dissenters, notwithstanding the rec-
54. 411 U.S. at 430 (citation omitted).
55. Justice Rehnquist stated: "While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction,
the instant case is distinctly not of that breed." Id. at 431-32 (citation omitted).
In support of this brief statement, Mr. Justice Rehnquist alluded to Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), a case wherein the Court unanimously voted to reverse a defendant's
narcotics conviction resulting from police misconduct that "shocks the conscience." In
Rochin, several deputy sheriffs forced their way into defendant's bedroom and ultimately took
defendant to a hospital where his stomach was forcibly pumped in order to retrieve two drug
capsules. The capsules were used as evidence to convict Rochin of illegal possession of mor-
phine. The Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the government's actions, on the
totality of the circumstances, had violated due process.
56. Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a
brief dissent.
57. 411 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 442. Justice Stewart reiterated the strong concern with the probative effect on
the jury of the type of evidence necessary to prove predisposition. Id. at 443-44.
59. Id. at 441.
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NOTES
ommendations of some lower federal courts"° and a significant num-
ber of legal scholars.' In addition, several other theories have been
suggested as possible bases for the constitutionalization of the en-
trapment defense. These embrace, for example, analogy to the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination. ' Several scholars have cogently argued that these
sources of an individual's constitutional rights necessarily encom-
pass entrapment-type situations-serving as a response to Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist's statement that the exclusionary rule was an im-
proper analogy. 3
In the aftermath of Russell, several federal court decisions 4
reflected a decline in the focus upon the level of police activity. For
example, where the initial determination by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. McGrath"5 was remanded
by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Russell, the
court rejected the entrapment defense which had been based on
government overinvolvement." Although the Fifth Circuit similarly
denied application of the objective approach in a number of cases,"
it chose to sustain the continued validity of United States v. Bueno5
60. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957), modified, 258 F.2d
318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307
(C.D. Cal. 1970).
61. See note 63 infra, and accompanying text.
62. One commentator summarized:
[T]he Constitution establishes three independent limitations on police con-
duct, breach of any one giving rise to a valid entrapment defense. The privilege
against self-incrimination prohibits the use of coercion in solicitation. Due process
forbids the conviction of any person for a solicited offense unless he had been
engaged in a course of criminal conduct or had a criminal design. The prohibition
against search and seizure requires the police to have reasonable grounds for
suspecting such conduct or design before they engage in solicitation. Through
acknowledged operation of the fourteenth amendment, each of these three limita-
tions is applicable to the state, as well as the federal government.
See also Cowen, supra, note 8; Rotenberg, supra note 8; YALE L.J., supra note 16, at 952;
Comment, U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 8; Comment, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 821; Comment 1971
UTAH L. REV. 266. For a list of alternative theories, see DEPAUL L. REv., supra note 8, at 573
n.26.
63. 411 U.S. at 430.
64. United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975);
United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Cuomo, 479 F.2d 688
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
65. 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the first McGrath decision, see note
50, supra.
66. United States v. McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974).
67. United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975);
United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
68. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of Bueno, see note 50 supra.
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by finding entrapment as a matter of law in situations where the
police furnished contraband to the defendant who subsequently sold
it to another government agent.69
It is against this background that an extremely divided Court
handed down its controversial decision in Hampton. In view of the
special difficulty of the questions presented, it is not surprising that
a majority opinion was not rendered. The Court voted five to three
to affirm Hampton's conviction; yet, Justices Powell and Blackmun
were not prepared to adopt the sweeping language of the plurality
opinion.
In each of the three opinions7" authored by the Hampton Court,
primarily two issues were discussed with varying degrees of empha-
sis. First, could entrapment be found where the defendant conceded
that he harbored a predisposition to commit the crime charged?
Second, does the fact that the government supplied the defendant
with the contraband involve a violation of due process?
The plurality opinion, written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist and
joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White, answered both
questions in the negative. In reference to the question of entrap-
ment, Mr. Justice Rehnquist reviewed briefly the analysis of
Russell, Sherman, and Sorrells, concluding: "We ruled out the pos-
sibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon
governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one, where the
predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was estab-
lished." 7'
Justice Rehnquist next stated that Hampton had misappre-
hended the meaning of the "due process" language in Russell.7" The
Justice then unconvincingly argued that Hampton differed from
Russell only in "degree" but not in "kind." Justice Rehnquist failed
to explain how Hampton had misconstrued the Russell language. In
short, what does the particular phrase mean? When would the activ-
ities of the police constitute a denial of due process? It would appear
that the plurality has now rejected that possibility.
Basically, the plurality opinion treated the due process analy-
sis, given much support by commentators,73 with surprisingly short
shrift. It recognized that the role of the government was more signif-
69. United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. A plurality opinion was written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist and joined by the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice White. Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun, filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion joined
by Justices Stewart and Marshall.
71. 425 U.S. at 488-89 (plurality opinion).
72. See note 55, supra.
73. See note 62, supra.
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icant here than in Russell.7" It emphasized, however, that Hampton
"acted in concert" with the illegal conduct of the Government.75 For
this reason, "[Tihe police conduct here no more deprived defen-
dant of any right secured to him by the United States Constitution
than did the police conduct in Russell deprive Russell of any
rights."76
Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the judgment of
the Court affirming Hampton's conviction. They believed that the
factual situation was "completely controlled by Russell."" In addi-
tion, the two Justices refused to accept Petitioner's contention that
the government's conduct constituted a per se denial of due pro-
cess.,,
Nevertheless, Justices Powell and Blackmun were unable to
join the plurality opinion because it went too far. The two Justices
viewed the opinion as enunciating an absolute rule. Citing to two
passages79 in the plurality opinion, they commented:
The plurality thus says that the concept of fundamental fairness
inherent in the guarantee of due process would never prevent the
conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the outra-
geousness of police behavior in light of the surrounding circum-
stances.
I do not understand Russell or earlier cases delineating the
predisposition-focused defense of entrapment to have gone so far,
and there was no need for them to do so.8°
Justices Powell and Blackmun believed that it was unnecessary to
decide whether a per se approach to entrapment was required where
predisposition had been established, since this point was left open
by Russell, "and this case is controlled completely by Russell."8'
Furthermore, the Justices suggested the possibility of utilizing the
74. 425 U.S. at 489.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 490-91.
77. 425 U.S. at 491-92 (concurring opinion).
78. Id. at 492.
79. The two passages read as follows:
[In Russell,1 [we ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment
could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one,
where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was established.
Ante, at 488-89 (emphasis supplied).
The remedy of the criminal defendant with respect to the acts of govern-
ment agents, which ...are encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of
entrapment. Ante, at 489. (emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 492.
80. 425 U.S. at 492-93.
81. Id. at 495.
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Court's supervisory powers or due process principles to protect a
defendant against gross government overinvolvement. They could
not envision, however, a situation where either the Court's supervi-
sory powers or due process could be appropriately applied."2
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Stewart
and Marshall joined, urged that reversal of Hampton's conviction
was required under either the objective or subjective approach to
the entrapment defense. Initially, Mr. Justice Brennan argued that
the objective standard was the proper basis for entrapment, al-
though he recognized that the Court had disregarded any view that
did not focus on predisposition.8 3 Justice Brennan then submitted
that the police conduct in the case at bar clearly violated this stan-
dard as a matter of law.84
Next, Mr. Justice Brennan postulated that Russell did not con-
trol the factual setting in Hampton, even under the majority or
"subjective" approach. 5 No argument was based on a lack of defen-
dant's predisposition, however, since Hampton conceded that he
may have been predisposed to sell narcotics." Rather, the dissenters
placed reliance on "[tiwo facts [which] significantly distinguish
this case from Russell."" First, Hampton had been supplied with
contraband by the government; whereas, the informer in Russell
had merely furnished the defendants with a legally obtainable
ingredient in the manufacture of contraband. Second, in Hampton,
the government had participated throughout the course of the ille-
gal activities; its agents had allegedly sold narcotics to and bought
them from the defendant. As indicated previously, five members of
the Court found both facts unpersuasive. Despite the absence of a
majority opinion, it is clear that Hampton nonetheless rejects the
analysis of those lower courts8 which have limited Russell to its
82. Id.
In a footnote, Mr. Justice Powell stated:
I emphasize that the cases, if any, in which proof of predisposition is not
dispositive will be rare. Police overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a
demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction. This would
be especially difficult to show with respect to contraband offenses, which are so
difficult to detect in the absence of undercover government involvement.
Id. at 495, n.7.
83. Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that perhaps a "reasonable alternative inquiry might
be whether the accused would have obtained the contraband from a source other than the
Government." 425 U.S. at 496 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
84. Id. at 497.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 500.
87. Id. at 497.
88. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Oquendo, 490
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974).
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precise facts. Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, cited a num-
ber of these and pre Russell decisions89 for legal support and reason-
ing, placing particular emphasis on cases decided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. Generally speaking, these decisions have taken the position
that "where the Government has provided the contraband that the
defendant is convicted of selling, there is entrapment as a matter
of law."9 This stance has been justified on the policy basis that, in
such situations, the government is in fact creating the crime and
jailing the "predisposed" defendant who carries it out. Mr. Justice
Brennan would therefore, "at a minimum engraft the Bueno princi-
ple upon [the subjectively-oriented entrapment] defense and hold
that conviction is barred as a matter of law where the subject of the
criminal charge is the sale of contraband provided to the defendant
by a Government agent."'"
With respect to the application of his analysis to the states via
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice
Brennan postponed consideration. In a footnote, he explained that
for present purposes it would be sufficient to adopt his rule under
the Court's supervisory power over the federal courts. 2
Despite the absence of a majority opinion in Hampton, at least
one point is clear: it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to show that a defendant's established predisposition is not disposi-
tive. This is particularly true in contraband cases like the present
one.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's stubborn reliance on
a test so fraught with criticism and drawbacks is unfortunate. A
majority of the Court simply refuses to reconsider the analytical
framework for the entrapment defense. Hampton and its predeces-
sors represent blind adherence to a doctrine never really justified by
the Court. On the other hand, it is urged that the objective test has
a logical base and the support of the majority of legal scholars who
have considered the problem.
The present composition of the Court virtually precludes the
possibility that the objective test will be recognized, even as an
alternative basis for a defense of entrapment. Therefore, it remains
with the Congress to restructure the contours of the defense. 3 The
89. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno, 447
F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
90. 425 U.S. at 499 (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 500.
92. Id. n.4.
93. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973), the Court explained that since
the entrapment defense did not reach constitutional dimensions, Congress was free to legis-
late.
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American Law Institute has recommended legislation adopting, in
essence, the objective, police conduct approach. 4
Finally, there is little chance that a constitutional foundation
for entrapment will be accepted. The Supreme Court refused to
consider a due process challenge in the most extreme of contraband
cases, and even Justices Powell and Blackmun were not especially
encouraging in other areas. Essentially, the Court has once again
sanctioned an all-out war by police against hypothetically
"predisposed" individuals.
DOUGLAS KRAMER
The Freedom of Information Act: 1974 Amended
Time Provisions Interpreted
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia Circuit has interpreted the 1974 amended time provisions
of The Freedom of Information Act to mean that under excep-
tional circumstances, where an agency diligently processes re-
quests for information but physically cannot comply with the
restricted time limits, a court may grant the agency additional
time. The author suggests that the court's holding avoids a politi-
cal question that a less narrow holding would embrace. If the
amendments are to retain their force, Congress may need to clar-
ify the emphasis it intends for agencies to place on the screening
of requests as opposed to the performance of their normal regula-
tory duties.
Open America, a corporation, was organized to undertake pro.
jects in the public interest. One of these projects involved testing
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Code provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such
an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage
in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the
belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons
other than those who are ready to commit it.
(2) Except. . . [when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
offense charged] . . . a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he
proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to
an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the absence
of the jury.
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